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Abstract—Communication between the near field 
communication (NFC) devices occurs in a very close distance 
of less than 10 cm. In the NFC-based payment system, close 
proximity between devices will increase the security of 
transactions. The disadvantage is the interaction between 
devices requires more physical activity of device owners 
because the device must be brought near to other devices 
some times. Besides requiring more physical activity, NFC-
based interaction also takes a longer time because the device 
needs to be moved from one position to another. This paper 
proposed secure and efficient protocol that will reduce the 
physical activity of the device owners and reducing 
transaction time. The data exchange between merchant and 
payer will be executed without waiting for each other and 
one transaction will require two data transmissions are 
performed by the merchant and payer. Transactions are 
secured by the use of encryption on each data which sent by 
the merchant and payer. In addition, the protocol also 
guarantees the security of offline micro transactions and 
online macros transactions. 
Index Terms—NFC-based payment, transaction protocol, 
mobile payment, secure protocol. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Near field communication (NFC) is a short-range 
wireless technology which is the advanced development of 
RFID technology. NFC’s fundamental advantages 
compared to other wireless technologies like Bluetooth is 
the availability of the data storage facility known as the 
NFC tag. NFC is not just a replacement data cable as 
Bluetooth, but also as a means of store of data. Referring to 
the NFC Forum, NFC technology is currently used in three 
areas, namely sharing, pairing, and transaction. The three 
areas which are the use of NFC were developed with full 
support from various handset vendors. 
Wireless communication between the NFC devices, the 
NFC tag and the availability of NFC handsets support the 
development of contactless payment and the actual e-
wallet [1]. 
A protocol is needed to regulate the communication 
between two NFC devices. In payment system two devices 
are payer’s device and merchant’s device. The process of 
communication between NFC devices implemented with 
the use of  read / write tag facility, so it requires a protocol 
called protocol tag to tag. Writing or reading of the tag 
carried by each bring two NFC devices and is known as a 
tap. 
Protocols that are currently available is the protocol that 
manages the communication between the NFC with a peer 
to peer communication mode. This protocol needs a 
sequential process during data exchange. The mutual wait 
in the transaction process will require a longer time. 
This paper introduces the tag to tag protocol that is used 
in the macro and micro payments. This protocol is 
different from the existing protocols, especially in the 
process of data exchange that does not require waiting for 
each other and which party should initiate the data 
exchange. 
II. PROTOCOL DESIGN  
A. Micropayment and Macropayment 
Micropayment is a transaction amount between USD 10 
cent - USD 10. This payment can occur between merchant 
and payer or between NFC account owners. Micropayment 
is off-line transaction as e-wallet. Macropayment is a 
transaction of more than USD 10 to USD 200. 
Macropayment is online transaction in order to improve 
transaction security [2-5]. 
B. Protocol specific assumptions and notations 
Protocol is designed for communication between 
merchant and payer. The assumptions used in this protocol 
is the amount to be paid by the payer is known by  
merchant from NFC tags. 
The working principle of the protocol tag to tag is set up 
communication between NFC devices which carried out 
the data exchange process without which the device is 
determined to start communication. The second NFC 
device can initiate communication and mutual prosenya no 
waiting. 
The principle is not in communication with each other 
waiting to tag the selected tag in order for the 
communication process more efficient in terms of time. 
1) Notations: 
{P, M, TP}:  
a set of engaging parties payer, merchant, and third party. 
X->Y: 
X sends message to Y. 
{ X || Y }: 
 a set of messages or message components. 
EK [X ]:  
X symmetrically encrypted with the key K. 
H(.):  
one-way hash function such as MD5 
IDX:  
the identity (ID) of party X. 
TID:  
ID of the transaction. It is chosen by merchant and 
uniquely identifies a transaction. 
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{ ACCNOP , ACCNOM }:  
a set of payment account numbers of the payer and the 
merchant. 
AMOUNT:  
amount of the transaction. 
PSWD:  
payment password of the payer. 
ACCBALANCE:  
Account balance of the payer. 
IDENTX:  
Identification data of party x. This data more complete 
than ID. 
PAY_X: 
Pay status of party X. It is one of the values:ACCEPT, 
REJECT 
Ki:  
Every user produces similar Ki using the same secret 
formula.  Variables of the formula are predetermined and 
one of them given periodically by the third party. This can 
be used for banning accounts.  
KSM:  
Secret session key generated by merchant. It is at least 
128bits for security. 
KSP: 
Secret session key generated by payer. It is at least 128bits 
for security. 
MACX:  
The message authentication codes from party X. 
RANDX:  
The random number from party X. 
 
C. Micropayment Protocol 
Micropayment protocol is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
(am, ap) M: P: 
 
KSM= EKi (IDENTM) 
KSP= EKi (IDENTP) 
 
Merchant and payer generate shared session keys (KSM 




mm1=IDM || TID || AMOUNT || EKi[ H(ACCNOM)] || 
MACM || KSM; 
 
The merchant sends a message to payer which containing 
merchant's ID number, transaction number, payment 
amount, encryption of merchant's account number, 
MACM, and KSM.  
(P1) P->M: 
 
pm1=IDP || TID || ACCBALANCE || EKi[ H(ACCNOP || 
PSWD)] || MACP || KSP; 
 
The payer sends a message to merchant which 
containing payer’s ID number, transaction number, 
account balance, encryption of payer’s account number 
and password, MACP, and KSP. 
 
Figure 1.  Micropayment protocol. 
 (bm) M: 
 
Merchant check payment amount and payer’s account 
balance. If AMOUNT < ACCBALANCE then value of  
PAY_M  is ACCEPT. Otherwise if AMOUNT > 




Payer check payment amount and account balance. If 
AMOUNT < ACCBALANCE then value of  PAY_P  is 
ACCEPT. Otherwise if AMOUNT > ACCBALANCE 
then the value of PAY_P is REJECT. 
The status of PAY_P is validated by confirmation of the 




mm2=IDM || TID || AMOUNT || PAY_M || EKi[ 
H(ACCNOM )] || MACM || KSM; 
 
The merchant sends a message to payer which 
containing merchant's ID number, transaction number, 
payment amount, PAY_M, encryption of merchant's 




pm2=IDP || TID || ACCBALANCE || PAY_P || EKi[ 
H(ACCNOP ||PSWD)] || MACP || KSP; 
 
The payer sends a message to merchant which 
containing payer’s ID number, transaction number, 
account balance, PAY_P, encryption of payer’s account 
number and password, MACP, and KSP. 
(cm) M: 
 
The merchant verifies the value of PAY_P. If PAY_P 
='ACCEPT'&PAY_M='ACCEPT' then the payer’s 
payment fund is deposited in a merchant account and a  
purchase receipt is printed.  
    
 (cp) P: 
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Figure 2.  Macropayment protocol. 
The payer verifies the value of PAY_M. If PAY_P 
='ACCEPT'&PAY_M='ACCEPT' then the payer’s accout 
balance is reduced and a  payment status is displayed on 
screen.  
D. Macropayment Protocol 
Macropayment protocol is shown in Fig. 2. 
 (am, ap) M, P: 
 
KSM= EKi (IDENTM) 
KSP= EKi (IDENTP) 
 
Merchant and payer generate shared session keys (KSM 




mm1=IDM || TID || AMOUNT || EKi[ H(ACCNOM)] || 
MACM || KSM; 
 
The merchant sends a message to payer which 
containing merchant's ID number, transaction number, 
payment amount, encryption of merchant's account 




pm1=IDP || TID || ACCBALANCE || EKi[ H(ACCNOP || 
PSWD)] || MACP || KSP; 
 
The payer sends a message to merchant which 
containing payer’s ID number, transaction number, 
account balance, encryption of payer’s account number 
and password, MACP, and KSP. 
 
 (bm) M: 
 
Merchant check payment amount and payer’s account 
balance. If AMOUNT < ACCBALANCE then value of  
PAY_M  is ACCEPT. Otherwise if AMOUNT > 




mm1a=IDM || IDP || TID || AMOUNT || TIMESTAMP || 
EKi[H(ACCNOM)] || MACM || KSM; 
The merchant sends a message to third party which 
containing merchant's ID number, payer's ID number, 
transaction number, payment amount, timestamp, 




tpm=IDM || IDP || TID || AMOUNT || TIMESTAMP || 
EKi[H(ACCNOTP)] || MACTP || RANDTP 
 
The third party sends a message to merchant which 
containing merchant's ID number, payer's ID number, 
transaction number, payment amount, timestamp, 
encryption of third party's account number, MACTP, and 




The merchant checks random number from TP 
(RANDTP). If the random number is TRUE and PAY_M is 
ACCEPT then PAY_M is validated. If random number is 




Payer check payment amount and account balance. If 
AMOUNT < ACCBALANCE then value of  PAY_P  is 
ACCEPT. Otherwise if AMOUNT > ACCBAANCE then 
the value of PAY_P is REJECT. 
The status of PAY_P is validated by confirmation of the 




mm2=IDM || TID || AMOUNT || PAY_M || EKi[ 
H(ACCNOM )] || MACM || KSM; 
 
The merchant sends a message to payer which 
containing merchant's ID number, transaction number, 
payment amount, PAY_M, encryption of merchant's 




pm2=IDP || TID || ACCBALANCE || PAY_P || EKi[ 
H(ACCNOP ||PSWD)] || MACP || KSP; 
 
The payer sends a message to merchant which 
containing payer’s ID number, transaction number, 
account balance, PAY_P, encryption  of payer’s account 




The merchant verifies the value of PAY_P. If PAY_P 
='ACCEPT'&PAY_M='ACCEPT' then the payer’s 
payment fund is deposited in a merchant account and a  
purchase receipt is printed.  
    
 (cp) P: 
 
The payer verifies the value of PAY_M. If PAY_P 
='ACCEPT'&PAY_M='ACCEPT' then the payer’s accout 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION 
Fig. 3 shows implementation of tag to tag protocol in 
micropayment. NFC’s user or account owner chooses 
product items to be purchased by way of reading the 
product tag. After selecting the product, NFC user will 
verify the purchase and the amount to be paid by 
transferring data on NFC handset to the NFC payment 
system. Monitor display will show the results of 
verification. Once product items and the amount to be paid 
are correct, user will pay through the NFC payments 
application. The receipt will be used by the inspector to 
check product items. Macropayment process is shown in 
Fig. 4. The difference between macropayment and 
micropyment is when user will pay. In macropayment, 
before the user pays the merchant asked for verification 
from the third party. Payment process can be done if the 
third party permits. 
The applications were developed using Android 2.3 
operating system smartphones which are Samsung Nexus 
S. All applications were programmed using Android 
software development kits (SDK). The efficient tag-to-tag 
NFC protocol system proposed in this paper has been 
developed and run well. Process payments using NFC can 
be seen in Figure 5. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this paper Ki is important key which is generated 
using the formula Ki =  fki (a, b, c, ...) where a, b, c, … are 
secret variables. Every user produces similar Ki where 
variables of the formula are predetermined and one of them 
given periodically by the third party. This key can be used 
for banning accounts. If two users do not have similar Kis, 
the transaction cannot be continued.  
A. Efficiency 
All encryption and decryption protocols computed in 
mobile devices are symmetric encryption, so the 
computations in mobile devices need only a small 
resource. In micropayment protocol, it only computes 
encryption and decryption twice in mobile device. In the 
macropayment protocol, the encryption and decryption 
protocols computed three times. Other computations which 
need more resources like asymmetric encryption and 
decryption are processed in a server. Moreover, the tag-to-
tag protocol has better time efficiency than ordinary 
protocol because it does two processes in every unit of 
time.  
B. Confidentiality 
In the protocol, the sensitive part of payment 
information, such as ACCNOP, ACCNOM, ACCNOTP and 
PSWD, are encrypted by the secret key which are only 
shared by the payer and the merchant or by the payer and 
the third party. When merchant receives a payment 
message from payer, PAY_P (unencrypted part of the 
message) is verified by the merchant to know the status of 
payer’s payment (rejected or not). The payer’s session key 
is used for decrypting the ciphertext part of the message. 
Therefore, the payer’s privacy of payment transaction is 
preserved because the sensitive part of the message is 
encrypted. This encrypted part cannot decrypted by anyone 
not having the session key. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Micropayment process. 
 
Figure 4.  Macropayment process. 
 
Figure 5.  Payment process. 
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C. Difficulty of alteration 
The protocol allows the issuer to detect whether the 
significant data have been altered. Suppose that a dishonest 
person wants to modify the data in the transaction, he 
replaces the original value of data with a different value 
data*. In this case he should also replace the value of the 
message authentication codes (MAC). In the protocol, no 
person other than the final receiver knows the secret string. 
Consequently other persons cannot directly compute the 
MAC of the fake message. Since the hash function is 
computation resistant, then it is computationally infeasible 
for the other person to compute the MAC for any value 
data* different from the original value data. When the 
dishonest person sends data* to the receiver, the receiver 
will compute the MAC and find out that this value is 
different from the one stored in the message. Therefore, the 
receiver will reject the message. 
D. Difficulty of alteration 
The protocol allows the issuer to detect whether the 
significant data have been altered. Suppose that a dishonest 
person wants to modify the data in the transaction, he 
replaces the original value of data with a different value 
data*. In this case he should also replace the value of the 
message authentication codes (MAC). In the protocol, no 
person other than the final receiver knows the secret string. 
Consequently other persons cannot directly compute the 
MAC of the fake message. Since the hash function is 
computation resistant, then it is computationally infeasible 
for the other person to compute the MAC for any value 
data* different from the original value data. When the 
dishonest person sends data* to the receiver, the receiver 
will compute the MAC and find out that this value is 
different from the one stored in the message. Therefore, the 
receiver will reject the message. 
E. Fund security 
The protocol takes effective measures of fund allocation 
to protect the benefits of both merchants and payers. After 
merchant receiving the payer’s authorization, then the 
payer’s payment fund is deposited in a merchant account. 
On the one hand, the payer gives the merchant an 
assurance that the payment fund will be used for the 
transaction and the merchant can go on business with the 
payer. On the other hand, once there is not enough fund in 
payer account then the transaction automatically discard 
and avoid the payer loss money. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper explained an effective tag to tag NFC 
Protocol for secure mobile payment using mobile devices. 
The protocol has the advantages as follows: (1) The 
protocol does not require too much computational resource 
for optimizing the payment processes. (2) The off-line-
update key mechanism enhances the security of mobile 
payment. (3) Sensitive payment data is encrypted by one-
session-one-key so that the protocol preserves payers’ 
privacy. (4) The protocol takes effective measures of fund 
allocation to protect the benefits of both merchants and 
payers. 
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